Prevent vendor bank-change fraud with mandatory verification layer

Where this came from

Reddit

There's a fraud pattern that quietly drains finance teams: someone emails accounts payable pretending to be a vendor or from a genuinely compromised vendor mailbox and says "we switched banks, here's the new account." Sometimes there's a spoofed call to back it up. The payment gets approved through every normal…

The pain

Target finance and AP teams facing repeated vendor bank-change scams. A verification orchestration layer forces authenticated vendor account confirmation before any payment clears, stopping business email compromise losses.

Who it is for

Finance-led mid-market companies with recurring vendor payments and decentralized AP approval, primarily US-headquartered firms with 50-2,000 employees and annual spend with 100+ vendors. Typical buyer: VP Finance, Head of AP, Director of Procurement, or Risk/Compliance owner who owns AP controls budget.

Source pains

• Accounts payable clerks approve vendor bank-change requests after email or phone confirmation - fraudsters exploit this monthly or more often, causing one-off large losses per incident (from thousands to millions).
• Finance managers have no reliable, automated step to confirm that new account details actually belong to the vendor - current workflows rely on human phone calls or email threads that are easy to spoof.